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FEATURE COMMENT: Reflections On The
Federal Procurement Landscape
Having recently completed my service as the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, I want
to set out here my thoughts about the current state
of the federal procurement system. I was greatly
honored to be nominated by the president in October 2009, and confirmed by the Senate in November
2009. More than 20 years of work in the federal
procurement law field, first in private practice and
then at the Government Accountability Office, provided me with the advantage of familiarity with
the procurement system and with many of the key
stakeholders, especially the attorneys.
By the time I was sworn in, shortly after
Thanksgiving 2009, the administration had already
issued a number of significant procurement-related
documents. While those documents reflected a
range of policies, I viewed my key goals as three
in number: strengthen the acquisition workforce,
increase fiscal responsibility in acquisition and
rebalance our relationship with contractors. Those
goals were not driven by ideology—at least not on
my part—but by an assessment of the reality we
faced in 2009.
Before turning to these, it is worth contemplating the goals that are not on the list. I had no
interest in pushing another wave of “procurement
reform” in the sense of legal reform because I do
not view our acquisition statutes as out of date,
nor do I believe that our regulations require a
major rewrite. On the contrary: Observing the
legal reforms in other countries, whether it is the
EU’s proposal to revamp its Procurement Directive or the World Trade Organization’s newly
4-115-709-0

revised Agreement on Government Procurement,
I am struck by how fundamentally sound our legal framework is and how little legal reform we
need. That is not to say that the Federal Acquisition Regulation cannot be improved—I remain
concerned, for example, about the adequacy of the
FAR’s guidance on blanket purchase agreements
and task orders—but the federal procurement
system does not require a massive revision along
the lines of what was done in the 1990s.
Contrary to some people’s hopes, I also did
not view insourcing as a goal. While, as explained
below, some insourcing was needed where work
had been improperly contracted out, I never took
the view that insourcing per se should serve as a
goal. For various reasons, I also had little appetite
for restarting public-private competitions, whether
under a revised Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-76 or otherwise.
Strengthening the Federal Acquisition
Workforce—Virtually everyone paying attention
to the U.S. procurement system since the 1990s has
decried the decline of the acquisition workforce. My
new colleagues at The George Washington University Law School repeatedly chronicled this trend.
See, e.g., Schooner, Feature Comment, “Empty
Promise For The Acquisition Workforce,” 47 GC
¶ 203; Yukins, Feature Comment, “A Pedagogical
Perspective On Training The Acquisition Workforce,” 47 GC ¶ 204. One of the most thorough
analyses of the impact of that decline on the nation’s defense capabilities was that led by Professor
Jacques Gansler, former undersecretary of defense
for acquisition, technology and logistics and now
at the University of Maryland. Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Report of
the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program
Management in Expeditionary Operations (Oct.
31, 2007) (commonly referred to as the Gansler
Commission Report). As professors Schooner and
Yukins, the Gansler Commission, and others have
pointed out, the acquisition workforce crisis is far
more significant than the mere decline in numbers

© 2012 Thomson Reuters

¶ 51

over the past 20 years, because training and stature
also suffered during the last two decades.
Moreover, the decline was not limited to the
personnel in the agencies’ contracting offices (the
people in the 1102 job series). Virtually every key
role in acquisition planning, as well as in contract
management, was overstretched, undertrained and
undervalued. To give one specific, but very important, example: During my tenure as administrator,
I consistently heard concern that both defense and
civilian agencies had failed to maintain a cadre of
cost and pricing specialists, which led to inadequate
acquisition planning, poorly conducted negotiations
and failures in contract administration.
Particularly problematic because the Government
dramatically expanded reliance on contractors was
the failure to appoint and train enough contracting
officer’s representatives or CO’s technical representatives. Those officials represent the Government
in the field, and—when adequately equipped and
trained—play a critical role as COs’ “eyes and ears,”
ensuring that the contractors perform in accordance
with the contract, and timely alerting the COs when
contractors run into unexpected problems or fail to
meet their contractual obligations. Many observers
have documented the impact of inadequate staffing
of the COR function, particularly in the context of
overseas work. See, e.g., Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq (CWC), Final
Report to Congress: Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks (August 2011)
at 162–63; Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace:
Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized
Foreign Affairs (2011) at 82–86.
Increasing Fiscal Responsibility—This priority, too, was a reaction to the changes that had
occurred in the years between 1992 and 2009, and
especially since 2001. The amount of taxpayer funds
spent on contracted goods and services rose almost
nonstop from 1992 through 2009. Instead of annual
figures in the range of $150–$200 billion, as we had
seen in the 1990s, by 2009 we were spending $550
billion a year. That rate of increase—something like
12 percent per year between 2001 and 2009—was
unsustainable. Moreover, the increased spending
translated into increased work for the overworked
acquisition professionals in the agencies.
The dramatic dollar increases only tell part of the
story. How we bought was also problematic. More and
more, we had shifted from individual procurement
2
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contracts to the use of indefinite-delivery, indefinitequantity contracts, frequently awarded to multiple
contractors and often used by multiple agencies. The
General Services Administration’s Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS) alone came to account for nearly
$40 billion in annual sales—nearly one in 12 of the
taxpayer dollars paid to contractors. When the FSS
number is included in the overall figure for spending
going through IDIQ contracts, our estimate was that
it reached something like $200 billion a year. That
shifted the focus in the acquisition system from the
award of these “umbrella” contracts to the award of
task and delivery orders under them. But at that
lower level, the rules, at least as they were widely
understood in the late 1990s and early 2000s, led to
inadequate transparency, competition and accountability. Although Congress had legislated improvements in all three of those areas in recent years,
implementation challenges abounded.
The situation was made more complicated by two
further changes, one substantive, one procedural. The
substantive change was the shift from buying mainly
goods to buying mainly services. Buying services,
especially professional services, requires skills and
knowledge different from what is needed to buy goods,
and the skills and knowledge were not always present in our acquisition workforce. To those challenges
we had added, in the world of the FSS, a new layer of
procedural complexity, through the widespread use of
blanket purchase agreements.
Developed for reasons outside the scope of this
Feature Comment, BPAs became a new layer between
the FSS contracts and the individual task and delivery orders. Unlike the Government-wide FSS contracts, BPAs have typically been agency-specific (or
even component-specific), and, again unlike the FSS
contracts, they have been cloaked in a lack of transparency. The result was that if a CO in one agency
was considering entering into a BPA with a vendor
for goods or services under the vendor’s FSS, she or
he would effectively have no way to know whether
another agency had already negotiated and signed a
BPA for the same goods or services with that vendor.
Instead, the CO would need to spend time and effort
negotiating a new BPA with the vendor, which might
have prices less favorable than those already negotiated by the other agency. In short, BPAs, as they were
being used, encouraged agency- and even componentspecific contracting, and impeded Government-wide
approaches.
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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Rebalancing Relations between the Government and Contractors—In the years since
1992, relations between the Government and its
contractors had changed dramatically and, in our
judgment, gotten badly out of balance. One example
is the weakness of the Government’s management
of its contractors, noted above, but there were more
fundamental imbalances. One was highlighted in
the Memorandum on Government Contracting that
President Obama issued March 4, 2009. As the president explained in that memo, the line between work
that could appropriately be assigned to contractors
and work that should be reserved for performance by
federal employees had become blurred.
Since the mid-1990s, an enormous amount of
work that historically had been performed by civil
servants was outsourced to contractors. While the
decision to outsource was sometimes based on solid
analysis, in many cases it was driven by ideology
(some believed that contractors were by definition
less expensive or more efficient), or by all-too-practical considerations (getting contractors on board
through a task order under an existing IDIQ contract can be accomplished much faster than hiring
federal employees), or even by what I suspect were
unconscious political assumptions regarding optics
(by relying on contractors, the Government could do
just as much without looking like “big government”).
But whatever the reason, the Federal Government had come to depend on contractors—at home,
but also in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas.
And dependence on contractors sometimes crossed
the line from healthy use to unhealthy overreliance,
especially with respect to services. As the CWC wrote
in its report, the use of contractors had become the
“default option.” I remember a junior member of an
agency’s contracting office telling me, in a mix of
frustration and regret, that in her agency service
contractors told the agency what it needed, wrote up
those needs as statements of requirements and then
won contracts to meet those needs. At another agency,
I was told that no federal employee understood the
agency’s information technology system and that the
contractors were in control.
Coupled with these problems, though, I also
heard repeatedly about a breakdown in communication between the Government and contractors. In
many cases, I heard that the acquisition professionals were uncertain how to interact with contractors.
They feared that communications with contractors
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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would lead to problems with their agency’s inspector
general or their agency’s attorneys, or to the filing of
a bid protest. In many cases, it seems, the overworked
federal acquisition staff simply did not believe that
they could afford to take time to meet with contractors. Whatever the reason, the result was a strained
relationship with inadequate communication.
Tackling the Priorities—Throughout my tenure as OFPP administrator, I worked to open up channels of communication. With my background in acquisition, I was comfortable listening to other acquisition
professionals across the Federal Government, and I
did that in abundance. For example, the priorities
set out above, and potential ways to address them,
were discussed in meetings of the Chief Acquisition
Officers Council as well as in monthly conference
calls that we initiated with agencies’ senior procurement executives. Because the Department of Defense
accounts for more than 60 percent of contract spending, I spent much time working with DOD, especially
with the leadership of the Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy office.
We also revived the Front Line Forum that Professor Steve Kelman had created when he was OFPP
administrator in the mid-1990s. Four times per year,
we brought together about three dozen front-line acquisition staff from civilian and defense agencies. We
heard their views on the challenges they faced and
on the steps that we were considering taking. I also
conducted dozens of visits to agencies, and whether
at Kirtland Air Force base in Albuquerque, N.M., or
at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
outside Baltimore, Md., whether at large agencies
or small ones, the discussions were a chance to hear
from people on the front line and to get their input.
Throughout my tenure, I also met with other
stakeholders in the complex world of federal acquisition. From my very first day on the job, I was meeting
with contractors—officials from professional associations as well as from individual companies—because
I was determined to increase and improve communication between us in the administration and Government contractors. Meeting with other stakeholders
was a routine part of my job, including (but, as they
say, not limited to) members of Congress and their
staff; trade unions and their representatives; staff
from GAO, where I worked before my appointment as
OFPP administrator; academics; and representatives
of professional associations, such as the American Bar
Association’s Section of Public Contract Law.
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From the start, we were focused on addressing
the three priorities set out above. But there were,
of course, other issues along the way, some of them
very important, such as increasing small business
participation in the federal marketplace. Other issues
were frustrating distractions, such as responding to
efforts on the Hill to legislate automatic, punitive
debarment of contractors for various reasons. While
our work was sometimes used by stakeholders for
parochial purposes—to trash the federal workforce
or bash contractors, depending on the individual
stakeholder’s agenda—we tried to stay focused on our
priorities throughout.
Progress Made in Strengthening the Acquisition Workforce—Although the progress was
limited and the outlook remains problematic, I believe that we made headway in strengthening the
federal acquisition workforce. In terms of numbers,
the president’s fiscal year 2011 budget included $158
million for the civilian agency acquisition workforce
(the Department of Defense has separate funding).
Despite the investment of much time on the Hill and
the generally supportive reaction we received from
both Republicans and Democrats, in both houses, we
did not get the full $158 million we asked for—but we
nonetheless saw agencies devote more resources to
their acquisition professionals. That pattern repeated
itself for FY 2012 as well.
We succeeded in reversing the trend of slashing
the numbers of 1102s, both across DOD and in many
(but not all) civilian agencies. The numbers of 1102s
are up, on the order of a 5- to 12-percent increase
from a few years earlier. While the various formulas
for calculating the number of contracting staff that
an agency needs are problematic, I am confident that
we are not yet at an adequate level. Moreover, we
still have a disproportionate number of acquisition
staff in many agencies who are at or near retirement
eligibility, so we must anticipate a large number of
retirements over the next five years.
With the mood on the Hill not favorable to further
federal hiring, I am concerned that we will repeat
the mistake of the past and let the number of 1102s
go down again. There is some comfort in hearing
supportive words from all sides; notably, both Rep.
James Lankford (R-Okla.), chair of the Oversight and
Government Reform Subcommittee on Technology,
Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and
Procurement Reform, and Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-Va.),
ranking member on that subcommittee, expressed sup4
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port for the acquisition workforce in my last hearing
as administrator, on Nov. 16, 2011. Nonetheless, as I
indicated at that subcommittee hearing, I believe that
the acquisition workforce numbers are very much at
risk going forward.
Tracking the numbers for members of the acquisition workforce outside the contracting offices—in
particular, for contracting officer’s representatives—is
more difficult than counting 1102s. For various reasons, DOD does not count CORs as part of the acquisition workforce at all, and obtaining reliable data
at civilian agencies presents a challenge as well. The
Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) has been working
to develop a database that will include better data
on CORs, but, as of now, the information is far from
complete.
In terms of training for the workforce, we made
some progress, but, as with the numbers, the progress
is tenuous. Both the Defense Acquisition University
and FAI are under new leadership that is committed
to improving training. In addition, other agencies
have also improved their training capability, most
notably the Department of Veterans Affairs, with its
Acquisition Academy in Frederick, Md. The challenge
will be to ensure that all of those facilities provide
training that is well-designed, relevant and timely.
Some of the course material that I saw was quite
good, and the heightened emphasis on having useful
training for CORs is particularly encouraging. Despite the improvements, I did not hear consistently
positive feedback from the people on the front lines
of the contracting agencies, so much work evidently
remains to be done—and in a world in which budget
pressures put training dollars at risk.
Progress Made in Buying Less and Buying
Smarter—The administration did succeed in stopping the year-on-year increases in spending. That was
not something that the acquisition workforce could do,
of course, since it is program personnel, not contracting staff, who determine an agency’s needs, whether it
is major weapon systems or support services. But the
president set a tone of restraint in spending, and the
message clearly got through. In FY 2010, for the first
time since 1997 (and, aside from a limited increase
in that year, for the first time since 1993), spending
on contracts went down: from about $550 billion in
FY 2009 to just over $535 billion in FY 2010. The FY
2011 figures are apparently in that same lower range.
That still means more than half a trillion dollars of
taxpayer funds spent on contracts each year—but,
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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as with the number of the acquisition workforce—at
least the problematic prior trend was reversed.
The focus of our efforts in the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy was buying smarter. It was here,
I believe, that our efforts to strengthen, listen to
and work with the acquisition workforce paid off. In
dozens, if not hundreds, of meetings, we encouraged
federal acquisition professionals to innovate, try different approaches and learn from one another. The
result: new ideas being tried, and word about them
being shared across the Government. I remember a
meeting with one agency in which I learned that they
had never tried an electronic reverse auction—and
when they heard how the auctions work, they were
enthusiastic to try one. Similarly, at the annual reviews we conducted with most contracting agencies
(called AcqStats, for acquisition status reviews), we
learned of innovative approaches that agencies were
developing, and we shared that information.
We promoted a reduction in the use of contract
types that were risky for the Government, and therefore for the taxpayers: contracts awarded sole-source,
and where a competition was held, but only one bid
came in; and contracts for which the pricing structure
shifted too much cost risk to the Government. We
found broad agreement about the need to increase
competition, and I was heartened by DOD’s focus on
“real competition” and reducing the number of one-bid
competitions. (I should note in passing that, although
DOD often announced its own initiatives, they were
fully consistent with the Government-wide effort.)
On pricing structures, I often heard agreement
on the need to reduce the use of time-and-materials
contracts, but I also heard concerns that pressure to
reduce the use of cost-reimbursement contracting
might lead to bad results. Those concerns resonated,
so I focused primarily on increasing competition and
reducing the use of T&M contracts. In our AcqStats
with agencies, we saw considerable progress on both
of those fronts, but, particularly with respect to avoiding sole-source and one-bid contracts, this is clearly a
battle that will need to be fought again and again to
increase the competition that is a bedrock principle
of our acquisition system.
An important development that arose from
studying the data and conducting discussions with
agency personnel was our focus on increasing fiscal
responsibility in what we came to call management
support services—a suite of services that include information technology support as well as more general
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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professional advisory services. We became convinced
that spending on these services warranted further
attention, for several reasons.
First, they were an area of particularly fast
growth—the rate of increase in spending on them
exceeded the already rapid increase in contract spending generally. Second, contracts for these services are
frequently structured as T&M contracts, with the
associated cost risk to the Government. And third,
when we asked agency personnel to identify services
for which they were concerned about overreliance on
contractors, these services were often named. The
bottom line was that we decided, by mid-2011, that
we needed to restrain spending in this area—not to
stop it, but to restrain it—and to be sure that agencies
focused on why and how they were using contractors
for management support. I am optimistic that we will
achieve the goal of a 10-percent reduction in spending
on these services, from something over $40 billion in
FY 2010, in the course of FY 2012.
Throughout my tenure as OFPP administrator, a
central part of our effort to promote smarter buying
related to interagency contracting. The fact is that
when multiple agencies buy the same goods or services on their own, there is a great risk that they are
duplicating one another’s efforts, wasting the time
of their limited acquisition staff and not necessarily
all obtaining an equally good deal. In my view, the
chaos of interagency contracting in earlier years had
wrongly led many people, including on Capitol Hill,
to conclude that interagency contracting was inherently bad. People pointed to the fact that the Government Accountability Office had added interagency
contracting to its “high-risk” list as proof that more
interagency contracting was bad—with the implication that more single-agency contracting was good.
This issue became a core concern of mine. While I
agree that interagency contracting had been abused,
and I therefore agreed when GAO included interagency contracting on its high-risk list some years ago,
our review led me to conclude that the problems that
GAO had identified—in particular, the lack of clarity
about each agency’s roles and responsibilities—had
largely been addressed. I was especially concerned
about a misunderstanding that arose repeatedly in
discussions about duplication, an issue mentioned
in connection with interagency contracting in more
recent GAO reports. While having two or three interagency contracts for similar goods and services
might represent some duplication, replacing those
5
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contracts with 20 or more single-agency contracts
would not decrease duplication—instead, it would
dramatically increase it. In short, I do not think that
there is justification any longer for listing interagency
contracting as an area of particularly high risk to the
Government.
Perhaps the most notable demonstration during my tenure as OFPP administrator of our efforts
to promote the use of interagency vehicles rather
than single-agency ones was the campaign referred
to as strategic sourcing. As mentioned above, over
the prior dozen years, we had seen a proliferation of
single-agency blanket purchase agreements under the
Federal Supply Schedules.
We decided to work with the General Services
Administration to promote the use of Governmentwide BPAs. For various reasons, the commodity that
we first took on was office supplies, which were frequently being purchased through single-agency, and
even single-component, BPAs. We encouraged GSA,
as it met with user agencies, the Small Business
Administration and industry, to develop an approach
that would lead to Government-wide BPAs offering
agencies good prices, high quality, sustainability and
Trade Agreements Act compliance—all while maintaining a high level of small business participation.
Although the details of the process deserve to be
described in more detail than is possible here, the
bottom line was this: GSA ultimately awarded a suite
of 15 BPAs, 13 of which went to small businesses. We
encouraged agencies to carefully analyze the BPAs,
and ultimately many agencies came to conclude that
the new BPAs met their needs. During the course of 18
months, from July 2010 to December 2011, we watched
agency purchasing of office supplies shift to those 15
strategic sourcing BPAs, reaching approximately $200
million during FY 2011. In the small but not insignificant area of office supplies, we had shifted from
single-agency vehicles to Government-wide ones, with
results that were beneficial for agencies, taxpayers and
small businesses—which obtained over 70 percent of
the dollars spent.
We worked with GSA and multi-agency commodity teams to identify the next target of opportunity,
which was print management. Wireless and software
licenses were not far behind. Especially in a time of
severe fiscal constraints, I believe that this shift from
single-agency to Government-wide contract vehicles
holds enormous potential for buying smarter in the
years to come.
6
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Putting these strategic sourcing efforts in a
broader context, I would say that during my tenure
we witnessed agencies doing more by way of innovation to buy smarter than we have seen in many
years—at least since the wave of “procurement reform” in the 1990s. Evidence of the breadth and depth
of what was happening was highlighted in a recent
GAO report that has received less attention than it
deserves. See Federal Contracting: OMB’s Acquisition
Savings Initiative Had Results, but Improvements
Needed (GAO-12-57); 53 GC ¶ 383.
While GAO criticized the Office of Management
and Budget and contracting agencies in the report for
various reasons, the report also presented what I view
as a picture of unprecedented progress. Among other
areas, GAO described agencies’ efforts to strengthen
their acquisition workforces, including improved
recruitment programs and better training. GAO also
recounted some of the steps that agencies are taking
to buy smarter. To name only a few of the many identified, GAO cited actions to improve acquisition planning, including measures to help with requirements
definition and selection of the appropriate contract
type; better communication with contractors to reduce
operational costs; better price negotiations, leading
to deeper discounts and lower prices; and smarter
use of technology to streamline acquisitions, obtain
better deals for taxpayers and promote small business participation. I viewed this as the consequence
of agencies’ acquisition professionals being allowed,
and encouraged, to demonstrate their business skills,
and the results have been impressive.
Progress Made in Rebalancing the Government’s Relationships with Contractors—Trying
to right the distortions in our relationships with contractors was not easy, and not without controversy.
We spent much time in my first 18 months on the job
working through issues that were eventually finalized
in OFPP’s policy letter on inherently governmental
and critical functions. While this is not the place to
delve into the details of the policy letter, it is worth
noting that the final product benefited from significant input from stakeholders: contractors and their
representatives, federal employee unions, contracting
agencies (including program staff as well as acquisition specialists), the Hill and many others. We heard
from stakeholders in public meetings, in written comments, and in various and sundry venues.
Although none of us would claim that the policy
letter solved the problems, I believe that it did clarify
© 2012 Thomson Reuters
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the line between inherently governmental functions
and those that can properly be turned over to contractors. More importantly, the policy letter provided
extensive management direction to agencies on how
to handle contractors’ involvement in critical functions. We are not going to stop using contractors to
support our critical functions, so it is important that
we manage them appropriately.
A good part of rebalancing our dealings with
contractors involves not taking work away from them
(“insourcing”), but rather providing better oversight
and management (and much of our time was spent
in various aspects of contract management). One of
my disappointments was learning how poor a job we
do at recording past performance information about
contractors and putting it into the relevant database.
Without good information being readily available, the
benefits of requiring past performance as an evaluation criterion are largely lost. As a result, we worked,
through the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council
and in other ways, to improve the collection and use
of past performance information.
One of the most politically charged areas we dealt
with was suspension and debarment. I view suspension and debarment as important tools to protect the
Government’s interests going forward, and talking
about them should be constructive. Yet time and
again, I found myself having to respond to politically
charged efforts to promote automatic ineligibility
for firms with one or another strike against them.
In October 2011, GAO issued a report identifying
characteristics of effective suspension and debarment
programs, which we found helpful, and we took those
characteristics into account in our efforts to ensure
that every agency has a meaningful suspension and
debarment function.
Finally, there was the “MythBusters” campaign
to increase and improve communication between the
Government and contractors. This was also part of
correcting our relationship with contractors, but this
was one element that contractors have supported enthusiastically. The campaign grew out of our concern,
discussed above, that agency personnel were, for many
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different reasons, reluctant to talk with contractors,
and we were concerned about the impact. In particular, Vivek Kundra (then our federal chief information
officer) and I, when we and our teams were probing
into the causes of large IT projects underperforming
and running over budget and behind schedule, heard
repeatedly that, during acquisition planning, there was
inadequate input from industry. We were told that the
most common result was a poor statement of requirements in the solicitation, sometimes unrealistically
overambitious, in other cases, calling for outdated technology or simply poorly thought through. Together, we
came up with the idea of the MythBusters campaign,
and it found a place in OMB’s December 2010 25-point
plan to improve federal IT purchasing. I spent much
time during my final year at OFPP promoting the
MythBusters effort, which involves a culture change
and will require a sustained effort, if we are going to
change the culture surrounding communications between the Government and contractors.
Conclusion—While I will leave to others to
judge how well we did, I believe that we did succeed
in stopping, and sometimes reversing, unsustainable
and unhealthy trends, some of which had been underway for more than a decade. That is as true with
respect to the increase in procurement spending as
with respect to the decline in the number of acquisition professionals. While we did not achieve as much
progress as we would have liked, for the first time
in many years, some of the key trends now point in
the right direction. The challenge will be to persist in
the face of budgetary constraints, which can lead to
pressure to slash spending, in particular on investment in the acquisition workforce. We need to keep
in mind the lessons of past mistakes, so that we do
not repeat them.
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Law School.
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